

Message Text

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21

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 CU-02 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10

L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 ACDA-05

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4348

INFO SECDEF WASHDC

USMISSION NATO

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

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DEPT FOR EUR/RPM

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE PFOR XG PARM

SUBJECT: CSCE: RELATIONSHIP WITH ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS

REF (A) GENEVA 5078; (B) MBFR VIENNA 331

1. WE ARE AWARE OF SIGNIFICANCE OF CSCE TEXT IN REF A
FOR MBFR NEGOTIATIONS, AND HAVE FREQUENTLY MADE POINT TO
NATO ALLIES AND OTHERS THAT IT WOULD BE UNFORTUNATE IF
CSCE RESOLUTIONS WERE IN ANY WAY WAY TO PREJUDICE PROCEDURES
OR PROSPECTS FOR THOSE IMPORTANT PARALLEL NEGOTIATIONS.
WE CAN UNDERSTAND CONCERN OF US DEL MBFR LEST WARSAW
PACT ATTEMPT TO MISUSE CSCE TEXTS IN SUBSEQUENT PHASES
OF MBFR.

2. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE CURRENT TEXT SHOULD BE LOOKED
AT IN LIGHT OF NEGOTIATING HISTORY, DURING
WHICH NEUTRALS AND ROMANIA HAVE BEEN DEMANDEURS,
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AND BOTH NATO ALLIES AND OTHER WARSAW PACT STATES

HAVE SOUGHT TO LIMIT AND QUALIFY FORMS OF EXPRESSION IN IT. IN GENERAL, WE BELIEVE NEUTRALS HAVE SOUGHT TO ACHIEVE FOLLOWING AIMS IN THIS PORTION OF CSCE TEXT:

(A) X X X TO ACHIEVE RECOGNITION OF THE PRINCIPLE THAT INDIVIDUAL STATES ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR THEIR OWN SECURITY DECISIONS, AND THEREBY TO REFUTE INDIRECTLY SOVIET CONCEPTS OF PAN-EUROPEAN SECURITY, AND/OR THE IDEA THAT SECURITY DECISIONS CAN BE MADE BY PROXY WHICH IS INHERENT IN THE BREZHNEV DOCTRINE;

(B) IMPLIED CRITICISM OF THE EXCLUSION OF NEUTRALS FROM OBSERVER STATUS AT MBFR; AND

(C) A "FOOT IN THE DOOR" FOR SOME FORM OF LIMITED PARTICIPATION BY NEUTRALS IN MBFR II, OR IN SOME OTHER FUTURE EUROPEAN REGIONAL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATION.

3. PRINCIPLE RESISTANCE TO NEUTRAL STRUGGLE TO ACHIEVE FIRST AIM HAS NATURALLY COME FROM SOVIETS, AND NEUTRALS HAVE HAD SYMPATHETIC AND SOMETIMES ACTIVE SUPPORT IN THIS STRUGGLE FROM NATO ALLIES. SECOND AIM HAS BEEN PURSUED BY ONLY ONE OR TWO NEUTRALS; MORE CONSERVATIVE MEMBERS OF NEUTRAL GROUP (SWEDEN, AUSTRIA, AND SWITZERLAND) HAVE GENERALLY DISCOURAGED THEM. IN FACT, AUSTRIAN NEUTRAL CAUCUS LEADER (GENERAL KUNTNER, WHO IS ALSO VICE CHIEF OF AUSTRIAN GENERAL STAFF) HAS TOLD US THAT HE HAS ON OCCASION BEEN FULLY AND COURTEOUSLY BRIEFED BY US DEL IN VIENNA, AND HAS NO COMPLAINTS ABOUT CURRENT ARRANGEMENTS. WE BELIEVE TEXT HAS BEEN PURGED OF ALL IMPLIED CRITICISM.

4. ON THIRD AND MOST TANGIBLE OF NEUTRAL GOALS, WE HAVE DURING NEGOTIATIONS ACKNOWLEDGED NEUTRAL INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENTS IN MBFR, BUT HAVE CLEARLY AND REPEATEDLY STRESSED THAT IT WOULD BE BEYOND COMPETENCE OF CSCE,
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AND INDEED POLITICALLY UNSOUND, FOR THIS CONFERENCE TO ATTEMPT TO ESTABLISH RULES FOR OTHER FORA WITH DIFFERENT PARTICIPATION. SOVIETS HAVE AGREED AND ACTIVELY SUPPORTED US ON THIS POINT, AND NEUTRALS HAVE IN THE END ACKNOWLEDGED VALIDITY OF OUR ARGUMENTS. AS A RESULT, WE BELIEVE THAT LAST SUBPARAGRAPH OF TEXT IS PHRASED IN GENERAL BUT UNEXCEPTIONABLE TERMS.

5. WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT SOVIETS MAY AT SOME FUTURE
TIMAE AGAIN RAISE POSSIBILITY OF NEUTRAL REPRESENTATION
AT A SUBSEQUENT PHASE OF MBFR. HOWEVER, IF THEY DO,
WE SUGGEST THAT CSCE TEXT COULD PROVIDE A PRIMA FACIE
CASE AGAINST ACTUAL NEUTRAL ATTENDANCE, EVEN AS
OBSERVERS, SINCE IT WOULD BE UNNECESSARY FOR PAR-
TICIPANTS "TO SEE TO IT THAT INFORMATION ...
IS PROVIDED" TO OTHERS IF THE OTHERS WERE PRESENT
AT THE NEGOTIATIONS.

6. FOR THESE REASONS, WE WOULD RECOMMEND AGAINST
REOPENING TEXT WHICH WAS "MENTALLY REGISTERED" ON
JULY 3. DALE

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